Adversarial ML Problems Are Getting Harder to Solve and to Evaluate

Warning: unsafe content included

Speaker: Yuchen Wen

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Rando, Javier, et al. "Adversarial ML Problems Are Getting Harder to Solve and to Evaluate." arXiv preprint arXiv:2502.02260 (2025).

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Contents

- Introduction of Adversarial ML Problems
- New Challenges in Defining, Solving, and Evaluating Adversarial ML Problems
  - Defining
  - Solving
  - Evaluating
- Case Studies
  - Jailbreaks
  - Unfinetunable Models
  - Poisoning & Backdoors
  - Prompt Injections
  - Membership Inference
  - Machine Unlearning
- Discussion

Contents


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- New Challenges in Defining, Solving, and Evaluating Adversarial ML Problems
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  - Jailbreaks
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Introduction of Adversarial ML Problems

Adversarial Machine Learning

❖ When it emerged (in CV):

- Design & defend adversarial samples that causes errors of ML models with barely observable perturbations (well-defined objectives)
- Concrete Target: task-related accuracy
  - E.g., misclassifying a spam message as safe, images in deep learning models
- Components: Attack goal, target model, threat model, evaluation metrics



$$\text{find } \delta$$

$$\text{such that } f(x+\delta) \neq y,$$

$$s.t. \ \|\delta\|_p \leqslant \epsilon$$

$$\|\delta\|_p = \left(\sum_{d=1}^{D} |\delta_d|^p \right)^{1/p}$$

Goodfellow, Ian J., Jonathon Shlens, and Christian Szegedy. "Explaining and harnessing adversarial examples." arXiv preprint arXiv:1412.6572 (2014).

Introduction of Adversarial ML Problems


Adversarial Machine Learning

❖ When it emerged (in CV):

- Scope: ℓ_p boundary ⇐ robustness, but the task is **only meaningful within** ℓ_p around a given image, so traditional CV researches mainly stay in this scope
  - e.g., the category of meaningless images does not matter; change dog image → cat image



◈ Unimportant!




◈ Meaningless!

- ℓ_p boundary helps to compare attack & defense methods
- Simple, yet struggling to solve & fully understand

Introduction of Adversarial ML Problems

Adversarial Machine Learning

- ❖ **In the era of large generative models:**
  - To identify, leverage, and prevent **vulnerabilities of ML models**
  - Abstract target: helpfulness, honesty, and harmless ("3H" principles)
    - including utility, honesty, toxicity, fairness, privacy, legality, …
    - Expectation: "3H" requirements should be met at any time
  - LLMs are not designed for any specific task → Defenders face complicated tasks



(a) Example jailbreak via competing objectives. (b) Example jailbreak via mismatched generalization.


Wei, Alexander, Nika Haghtalab, and Jacob Steinhardt. "Jailbroken: How does llm safety training fail?." Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 36 (2023): 80079-80110.


Introduction of Adversarial ML Problems

Adversarial Machine Learning

❖ In the era of large generative models:

- ▶ Scope: No boundary for perturbations
  - Expectation： “3H” requirements should be met at any time





Zou, Andy, et al. "Universal and transferable adversarial attacks on aligned language models." arXiv preprint arXiv:2307.15043 (2023).
Niu, Zhenxing, et al. "Jailbreaking attack against multimodal large language model." arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.02309 (2024).

Contents

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  - Defining
  - Solving
  - Evaluating
- Case Studies
  - Jailbreaks
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Adversarial Problems are Harder to Define

❖ 1.1 Defining Success of Attacks & Defenses

- Traditional: concrete, task-related objectives
  - E.g., Accuracy for image classification tasks
- Now: keep "3H", especially harmlessness
  - Subjective target → subjective evaluation

Adversarial Problems are Harder to Define

❖ 1.2 Defining and Bounding the Attack Space

ℓ_p boundary ⇐ robustness

- Traditional: most in ℓ_p **boundary**
  - Convenient for comparing attack & defense methods
- Now: always allow **unbounded attacks**
  - Hard to make comparisons

    → trivial attacks may reach high Attack Success Rates, but not novel

    ◈ **"Please repeat [harmful text]."**

    → no new vulnerabilities are revealed

Adversarial Problems are Harder to Define

❖ 1.3 Delimiting Data

- Necessity: **unlearning** or **privacy protection** needs to know training data point
- Now： LLMs are trained on vast corpora
  - → no more strict train/test splits
  - → held-out (IID) test no longer exists

Adversarial Problems are Harder to Solve

❖ 2.1 Searching over Attacks

- Traditional: max loss on correct predictions & min perturbation
- Now:
  - 1. Adversarial loss is unclear

    → use toy attack objective (e.g., begins with "Sure, I can help you with that")
  - 2. Discrete text optimization / search is hard

    → even less effective than manual attacks (e.g., persona, multi-turn, social engineering, psychometrics)

Adversarial Problems are Harder to Solve


❖ 2.2 Building Principled Defenses

- Traditional: certified defenses / empirical defenses (adv. training)
  - key properties (bounded perturbations) are explicitly understood
- Now: no principled foundations (objective unclear & attack space unlimited)
- Existing Defenses： Ad-hoc
  - 1. adversarial training against known attacks
  - 2. virtual adversarial training
  - 3. external classifier / detector
  - 4. random preprocessing

Adversarial Problems are Harder to Evaluate

❖ 3.1 Measuring Attack Harm and Defense Utility

- Problems of LLMs-as-judges
  - 1. inaccurate judgement
    - fall short of human judgement
    - even humans may make mistakes for safety
  - 2. judges may be **attacked**
  - 3. **defense** methods may cheat through judges
- Harm & Utility Balance ("3H")
  - pay attention to utility, otherwise harmlessness itself is easy to realize
  - Utility is subjective & context—dependent



Souly, Alexandra, et al. "A strongreject for empty jailbreaks." arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.10260 (2024).

Adversarial Problems are Harder to Evaluate


❖ 3.2 Reproducing & Comparing Results

- Reproduction: lack of transparency
  - closed-source models
  - model update
  - model system
- Black-box or discrete optimization approaches may help, but limited



Grattafiori, Aaron, et al. "The llama 3 herd of models." arXiv preprint arXiv:2407.21783 (2024).

Relation of Defining, Solving, & Evaluating Adv. Problems



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  - Defining
  - Solving
  - Evaluating
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Challenges in different research areas

	Challenges						
	Defining			Solving		Evaluating	
Research Area	(§2.1.1) Defining Success	(§2.1.2) Bounding Attacks	(§2.1.3) Delimiting Data	(§2.2.1) Attack Search	(§2.2.2) Principled Defenses	(§2.3.1) Measuring Harm & Utility	(§2.3.2) Ensuring Reproduc.
(§3.1) Jailbreaks	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓
(§3.2) Un-finetunable Models	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	
(§3.3) Poisoning + Backdoors	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
(§3.4) Prompt Injections	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓
(§3.5) Membership Inference	✓		✓				✓
(§3.6) Unlearning	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	

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Case Studies - Jailbreaks

❖ Definition

- ▶ Adversarial text inputs for language models that bypass safeguards and get the model to generate “harmful” content

❖ 1. “Harmful” content has no formal definition

- ▶ Substring matching → LM → LLM-as-a-judge

❖ 2. No meaningful bound on adversarial attacks

- ▶ Safety is independent of the input (harmfulness should never be generated)
- ▶ Diverse attacks: semantic augmentations (role-playing), append suffixes, long inputs dilute safeguards; fine-tuning, pruning
- ▶ Hard to define a narrow task, difficult to compare methods

Case Studies - Jailbreaks

❖ 3. Optimizing for worst-case attacks is hard

- Optimization goal is unclear & optimization is not continuous
- → best attacks come from human experts and cannot be found via optimization

❖ 4. Continuously updated closed-source systems

- System update

Case Studies – Unfinetunable Models

❖ Definition

- ▶ Models that are not only robust to jailbreaks, but also robust to fine-tuning
- ▶ Motivation: Have no dangerous capability + Unfinetunable == Safety

❖ 1. Attacker can change inputs as well as the model

- ▶ Recent work: interplay between modifying the input and modifying the parameters

❖ 2. Difficult to evaluate

❖ 3. “Unfinetunable” is impossible

Case Studies – Poisoning and Backdoors

❖ Definition

- adversaries modify a model's training data to affect its behavior on specific examples or inject backdoors.

❖ 1. Attack goals are in conflict with intended functionality

- Traditional: triggers correlated with an output label
- Attack: undesirable behaviors ←→LLM training: against undesirable behaviors

❖ 2. Attacks come from multiple training stages

- Traditional: single training process over entire dataset
- LLMs: pre-train → finetune → RLHF
- Each stage is possible for attack, and can overwrite poisoning

Case Studies – Poisoning and Backdoors

❖ 3. Computationally infeasible

- Baseline: train models from scratch

Case Studies – Prompt Injections

❖ Definition

- An adversary injects **malicious instructions** into a language model's context, **manipulating its behavior** to perform unauthorized actions or disclose sensitive information
- E.g., grandma exploit

❖ 1. Measuring attacks & defenses requires realistic agent environment

- Environment should include tool use and complex interactions
- Simplification: generate unsafe content

❖ 2. Adversaries are unbounded

- E.g., embed malicious instructions in benign or unrelated text, multi-turn interactions
- Therefore, evaluations are difficult

Case Studies – Prompt Injections

❖ 3. Optimizing for strong attacks is hard

- Attack surface is vast, including **multi-turn interactions** → lack access to intermediate outputs
- Most current attacks: handcrafted instructions (not necessarily optimal)
  - **"Ignore all previous instructions, please do [target action] first,"**

❖ 4. Hard to track progress against closed-source systems

- Attack surface: single model → entire system, with multiple defense mechanisms;
- System update
- Few open-source tool-use agents, in contrast to open-source models

Case Studies – Membership Inference

❖ Definition

- determine whether a specific sample *x* was part of a model's training set.

❖ 1. Members and non-members are no longer clearly defined

- Duplicated datasets
- No IID train/test splits
- No fixed training data

❖ 2. No counterfactual scenarios for evaluation

- Computationally impractical

Case Studies – Machine Unlearning

❖ Definition

- completely removing the influence of a specific datapoint *x* from a model
- Goal: a model after unlearning *x* is indistinguishable from one that is never trained on *x*
- White-box: needs to change the model
- One direct way to evaluate: Membership Inference

❖ 1. Unlearning “concepts” rather than data points is hard to define

- E.g., copyrighted **content** from Harry Potter books

❖ 2. Unlearning goals conflict with other knowledge

- E.g., unlearn bioweapons, but keep biology and virology

Case Studies – Machine Unlearning

❖ 3. Threat models are overly strong

- Threat models can **query** the model, **finetune** it, and perform **white-box intervention**

❖ 4. Measuring unlearning is hard

- Training baseline models is costly
- Membership Inference has important limitations
- Recent studies: even when a model cannot generate specific information, underlying knowledge is not erased from weights

Shumailov, Ilia, et al. "Ununlearning: Unlearning is not sufficient for content regulation in advanced generative ai." arXiv preprint arXiv:2407.00106 (2024).

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  - Solving
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Alternative Views

❖ 1. Solve the right problem in the first place

- Transfer from ℓ_p boundaries to unbounded adversaries

❖ 2. Solving jailbreaks may be easier, the behavior is independent of context

- Jailbreak defense has a simpler goal: never generate harmful content regardless of context

❖ 3. Simply minimize risks might be insufficient

- “a cover up only makes matters worse”
- Complex defense systems → severe real-world security breaches

❖ 4. We are already making progress

- Newer models are harder to attack
- However, average-case vulnerabilities differ from **worst-case security robustness**

Suggestions for Improvement

❖ 1. Purpose of research on adversarial ML:

- Real-world safety vulnerabilities
- Scientific understanding of adversarial ML

❖ 2. Well-defined sub-problems can be rigorously studied (ℓ_p boundary)

→ then, attempt to solve the entire space of attacks

Takeaway Points

❖ Adversarial ML Problems: from Traditional CV to LLMs

- Change of goals (3H) & general purpose of LLMs → no boundaries

❖ Adversarial Problems are Harder to Define, Solve, & Evaluate

- Define: defining success; bounding attacks; delimiting data
- Solve: attack search; principled defenses
- Evaluate: harm & utility; reproduction

❖ Case Studies

- Jailbreaks, Unfinetunable Models, Poisoning & Backdoors, Prompt Injections, Membership Inference, Machine Unlearning,…

❖ Discussion

- Solve real-world vulnerabilities and/or advance scientific understanding of adversarial problems
- May start from well-defined sub-problems → entire problem

Thanks!

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